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Recently, interest in Web Services has grown throughout the IT community. Especially when it comes to application 
integration, the employment of Web Services seems to be a promising approach. But despite the advantages of this 
technology, its deployment, particularly in the inter-organizational domain, remains very sparse. As studies show, companies 
are reluctant to use it mainly due to security concerns. In this paper we show how to improve the security of Web Services 
protecting them against “semantic” attacks by considering entire business processes instead of single method invocations. We 
propose a solution consisting of an authorization engine, which makes its decisions about the admissibility of a given call 
taking the relations between successive requests into account. Further, we sketch an implementation and explain how a 
modeling formalism such as the Business Process Execution Language for Web Services (BPEL4WS) can help to realize it. 
Concluding with an analysis of weak points, we pinpoint possible areas of future research activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Web Services are slowly moving beyond the hype and are becoming a serious technology as more and more companies are 
announcing their adoption. The problem with Supply Chain Management systems, to take an example for inter-organizational 
application integration, is their inherent need for a time consuming and costly integration of the software used by all 
participants. Unfortunately, this setback can lead to other problems. Once the integration has been accomplished, the nodes 
are coupled in a very tight way, leading to a rigid formation of enterprises rather than a flexible, agile and loosely coupled 
network. Especially for small and medium sized enterprises the decision to join in a network of organizations and the costs 
associated with it are most likely irreversible and the installed system can therefore thwart the ability to form new 
partnerships. 
One purpose of service-oriented architectures is to overcome the mentioned problems with monolithic systems. With the help 
of the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) companies can expose their functionalities as well as the corresponding 
format and semantic aspects. Potential partners of a supply net may rummage Universal Description, Discovery and 
Integration (UDDI)-registries in order to find a desired service. Method calls between systems are hereby encoded using the 
Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) over standard protocols such as the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), the File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP) or the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP).1 Though the concept of Remote Procedure Calls 
(RPC) is well known, Web Services present the first common standard that focuses on dynamic business networks (Iyer, 
Freedman, Gaynor and Wyner, 2003). Besides RPC messaging, Web Services also support document style messaging 
(McCarthy, 2002; Snell, Tidwell and Kulchenko, 2002). When speaking of method invocations in this paper we include both 
synchronous and asynchronous messaging style. 
Of special interest are the improvements in flexibility and the ease of integration. But despite the clear advantages of Web 
Services, they are not yet in widespread use. In the majority of cases, the technology has been adopted only for small projects 
or for feasibility studies. In order to tap the full potential of Web Services, they need to be applied to a wide range of inter-
organizational applications. As many studies unveil, the main reasons for the reluctance are security concerns (BEA, 2003; 
Cap Gemini Ernest & Young, 2002). The results of another survey (META Group, 2003), recently conducted by a consulting 
company, in which 262 enterprises were questioned about Web Services and their restraints or shortcomings, is shown in 
Figure 1. 
                                                          
1 For a comprehensive description of WSDL, UDDI and SOAP see (Newcomer, 2002; Apte and Mehta, 2002; Snell et al., 
2002). 
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Figure 1. Restraints and shortcomings of Web Services (based on META Group, 2003) 
Security concerns surrounding Web Services can be traced back to different facts. In the context of this paper, we identified 
the following four important reasons: 
1. To some extent Web Services are used to deliberately bypass existing security mechanisms. SOAP messages are 
“tunneled” over protocols such as HTTP or SMTP which are not filtered by firewalls. This opens up a security hole 
and is directly in contradiction to what firewalls are meant for (Schneier, 2000). 
2. Implementing Web Services can only provide noticeable benefit to a company if they can be used to realize parts of 
the business logic instead of simply receiving stock quotes or exchange rates. But by using them for important and 
critical business functions, the lack of security may lead to fatal consequences both for the company providing the 
services and for the legitimate users. 
3. Many applications include implementation flaws which can be exploited by an attacker. This danger especially 
arises in large systems or software that has been enhanced over time to match a changed business environment. A 
common field of application for Web Services is to use them for wrapping legacy systems, so that they can be called 
via standardized interfaces and protocols (Beimborn, Mintert and Weitzel, 2002). Appraising the security of such 
systems is complicated and even if existing weaknesses are known, it is difficult to subsequently secure these 
applications. 
4. One goal of business software is to automate processes without involving human decision makers. This requires an 
infrastructure capable of maintaining all critical secrets like private keys or other authentication tokens. 
When deployed internally Web Services are not as strongly exposed to possible attacks as in inter-organizational settings. 
This is one reason why the technology is currently used for enterprise application integration rather than for business-to-
business integration. But risks still exist in the former case and the considerations of this paper, although focusing on an inter-
organizational use, also apply to Web Services employed within a single company.  
Our research methodology is based on three pillars: literature review, evaluation of products and the development of a 
prototype. Due to limited availability of research material on securing Web Services in inter-organizational applications the 
development of the presented framework has been primarily inductive. Thus, we decided to evaluate the capabilities of 
commercially obtainable products in addition to a literature review. We discuss discovered gaps and derive the herein 
proposed concept.  
The solution we present in this paper consists of an authorization engine that we develop at the Bavarian Research Network 
for Information Systems (FORWIN). We start with an overview of existing security standards for Web Services and a 
summary of products already available. Before discussing an example involving Web Services deployed in an inter-
organizational environment, we describe the concept of an authorization engine making its decisions based on the observation 
of a whole business process. We then sketch a possible implementation of such a solution. Finally, we conclude with a 
discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach and an outlook on possible areas of future research. 
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EXISTING SOLUTIONS  
In this section we give an overview of existing efforts to protect Web Services. The first subsection contains a short summary 
of relevant security standards2 and explains why, taken alone, they do not suffice. The second part describes the concept of 
“XML application firewalls” and shows in turn their deficiency. 
Security Standards for Web Services 
Many efforts have already been made to standardize security mechanisms for Web Services. A lot of work has been done by 
the Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS, 2004) on one hand and by the World 
Wide Web Consortium (W3C, 2004) on the other hand. Table 1 summarizes the main specifications of OASIS and W3C 
concerning the security of Web Services. 
Abbreviation Standard From Description 
SAML Security Assertion Markup Language OASIS Exchange of authentication and authorization data  
 WS-Security OASIS SOAP extension including XML security protocols  
XACML Extensible Access Control Markup Language OASIS Description of access control policies 
XCBF XML Common Biometric Format OASIS Exchange of biometrical data 
 XML Digital Signature W3C Integrity and non-repudiation of digital content  
 XML Encryption W3C Confidentiality of digital content 
XKMS XML Key Management Specification W3C Key management 
XrML Extensible Rights Management Language OASIS Digital rights management 
Table 1. The main security standards for Web Services 
These standards are necessary to assure the authenticity, the confidentiality, the integrity and the non-repudiation of SOAP 
messages. However, their mere existence is not enough to guarantee an overall protection for Web Services. This is because 
they only constitute single building blocks, which have to be appropriately employed in conjunction with other application-
specific protocols. Besides, existing standards are often not sufficiently deployed and when implemented, serious errors 
frequently occur. Predetermined security frameworks consisting of encryption and decryption functions and of methods for 
the generation and verification of digital signatures help to avoid flaws, but unfortunately many application developers do not 
make use of them. Moreover, logical errors in the Web Services themselves, such as those presented in the example of the 
next section, can not be repaired by introducing new security standards. A possible way to protect potentially flawed and thus 
vulnerable Web Services is to use a firewall which verifies incoming messages.  
XML Application Firewalls 
The concept of firewalls is widely known and frequently used to filter out inadmissible network traffic. Depending on the 
ISO/OSI3 layer the firewall is acting at, we distinguish between “packet-filtering” (layer 3) and “circuit-filtering” (layer 4) 
firewalls. The former filter data packets based on their source and destination address or the port number they are sent to. 
Circuit-filtering firewalls on the other side observe entire TCP sessions. They prevent, among other attacks, so called 
“session hijackings”, which allow an attacker to take over control of a connection initiated by another computer. 
However, to secure Web Services it is not enough to block ports and to filter IP packets. Network traffic looking innocuous at 
the lower ISO/OSI layers may constitute an attack at the application layer (Middendorf, 2003). Unsuspicious IP packets can 
carry a SOAP message containing harmful code (Polster, 2003). As the security of the IT infrastructure (i.e. operating 
                                                          
2 (Polster, 2003) contains a short description of these standards. A more comprehensive presentation can be found in 
(Hartmann, Flinn, Beznosov and Kawamoto, 2003). 
3 ISO/OSI stands for the International Standards Organization/Open System Interconnection reference model. See e.g. 
(Forouzan, 1998). 
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systems, web servers etc.) is getting hardened, more and more attacks appear at the application level. An example for this is 
the so called “SQL injection”. There are web servers which do not take the precaution of ensuring that requests they get from 
a client are well formatted. Instead, they just take the received parameters and send them as part of an SQL query to the 
database. By feeding such a server with fake parameters, an attacker may access protected data or change its content 
(McDonald, 2004; Middendorf, 2003). Just as web applications can be fooled, Web Services too may be called with flawed 
parameter values. As the parameters expected by a Web Service are precisely described in WSDL, an attacker could invoke it 
using values that do not conform to the specified ones. 
Many security solution providers have recognized the need for firewalls dedicated to the protection of Web Services. They 
already offer solutions called “XML application firewalls”. Some examples are XML Filter from Microsoft®, Inc. 
(Microsoft, 2002), XML Firewall from Westbridge Technology, Inc. (Westbridge, 2004), SOAP Content Inspector™ from 
Quadrasis, Inc. (Quadrasis, 2004), as well as the products of Reactivity, Inc. (Reactivity, 2004), Vordel (Vordel, 2004), and 
Check Point™ Software Technologies, Ltd. (Check Point, 2004). (Middendorf, 2003) contains a description of products from 
some other providers. These solutions differ as to the risks they handle. The main capabilities of XML application firewalls 
include: 
• Validation of SOAP messages to check that they match the specified XML Schemas (syntax verification) 
• Authentication and authorization of the caller 
• Digital signature to assure the integrity of SOAP messages 
• Encryption to assure the confidentiality of SOAP messages 
• Protection of the underlying transport layer through TLS/SSL and IP based authentication (SASL)4 
• Detection of dictionary attacks on passwords and denial of service attacks 
The spread of XML application firewalls will increase when more organizations start to deploy Web Services. It is important 
to note that application level firewalls must not be seen as a substitution for firewalls acting at the lower ISO/OSI layers. The 
two kinds of firewalls, which some providers already integrate into a single product (Check Point, 2004), should rather be 
used in a complementary manner to enlarge the spectrum of covered threats. 
In a certain way, firewalls can be seen as a kind of authorization engines that have to decide whether a given action is 
admissible or not. In order to make appropriate decisions it is helpful to consider the whole chain of actions, instead of just 
looking at the current request. A deficiency of existing XML application firewalls is that they only examine single method 
invocations. The relations between successive calls are not considered. Yet, many attacks consist of a combination of 
requests, which differs from those appearing in regular use. SQL injection attacks succeed because systems are called with 
parameters they were not intended to receive. Similarly, one could imagine attacks on Web Services in which several 
methods are invoked in a combination and with parameters that the implementation was not designed to handle. This sort of 
“semantic” attack is what the approach we propose is aiming to protect against.  
NEW APPROACH 
We present a solution which improves the security of Web Services by imposing additional obstacles on a possible attacker. 
Firstly, we describe our approach which consists of an authorization engine making its decisions based on the observation of 
an entire business process. In the third subsection we illustrate our idea using an example involving Web Services deployed 
in an inter-organizational setting. Finally, we sketch a possible implementation. 
Description 
Usually, a Web Services provider offers a number of methods to be remotely invoked. They can be called in an arbitrary 
combination and with any parameters. But only a very small fraction of these possibilities is sensible from the application’s 
point of view. When buying an item for example, one first asks for its price and pays after that, not the other way around. The 
meaningful combinations can be modeled as business processes. Now, the idea is to execute Web Services only in the context 
of an instance of a business process. If an activity is not currently planned according to the business process, it will not be 
carried out. This way random access to potentially vulnerable Web Services can be avoided. The approach is meant to 
improve security by limiting access to Web Services in the same way that “design by contract” (Meyer, 1992) is meant to 
improve the reliability of software by imposing preconditions on method invocations to prevent erroneous calls.  
                                                          
4 For a description of TLS/SSL and SASL see (Rescorla, 2000; Joseffson, 2004). 
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Figure 2 shows where an authorization engine enforcing this restriction would be situated in the overall architecture. It is 


























Figure 2. The authorization engine's position in the overall architecture 
  
The approach resembles somehow that of intrusion detection systems (IDS), which monitor IT systems in order to detect 
anomalies indicating an attack. The difference consists in the way authorization decisions are made. Because it is impossible 
to model all admissible scenarios explicitly when protecting computer networks or operating systems, other methods are used 
to determine unauthorized activities. These can be divided into two categories. On one hand, there are IDS based on 
stochastic models of a system’s normal behavior. Such models are created by observing the (legitimate) interactions taking 
place during a certain period. If significant deviations to the modeled behavior occur, an alarm is triggered. On the other 
hand, methods exist which are able to detect predefined attack patterns. They permanently monitor the IT system and send 
out a warning as soon as one of the patterns appears. Considering Web Services, it is not possible to model attack patterns, 
because it is unknown which weaknesses in the services can be combined to form a threat. But in general, it is possible to 
precisely define the business processes the Web Services are intended to participate in. 
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Example 
Throughout this section we will explain our concept of an authorization engine to secure Web Services based on a fictitious 
example. Let’s consider a company providing IT services for travel agencies and the necessary steps to arrange and book a 
journey. There are seven different Web Services available to cover the business logic of this task: Get Airfare Quotes, Get 
Hotel Quotes, Choose Flight, Choose Hotel, Book Trip, Payment Received and Send Tickets. By using the first two services, 
the travel agencies are able to inform their clients about available flights and hotel rooms. Choose Flight and Choose Hotel, 
are then used to select the desired itinerary and accommodations, respectively. By executing the 5th Web Service the system 
books the chosen flights and hotels. The method Payment Received notifies the server about the incoming payment and the 
last service is finally used to trigger a mailing of the documents to the customer. 
 
Figure 3. Business process “journey booking” 
 
By using an XML application firewall one can assure the integrity of exchanged messages, the confidentiality of data about 
customers, the authentication and authorization of the connected travel agencies as well as the bindingness of a booked trip. 
Nevertheless, an authorization engine can help in further increasing security as shown in the following. Consider the business 
process depicted in Figure 3. In order to protect the system against “semantic” attacks, which may include method calls with 
malicious parameters or the invocation of several Web Services in an improper combination, the following rules could be 
specified: 
1. The parameter for the Web Service Choose Flight must match one of the results from the previous call to Get 
Airfare Quotes. The same is true for Get Hotel Quotes and Choose Hotel. Applying this rule prevents a potential 
attacker from exploiting possible implementation flaws in the Choose Flight and Choose Hotel Web Services, which 
may otherwise lead to unforeseen effects, for example, if dates are used during which the hotel or the flight is not 
available or sold out. 
2. Before calling Book Trip, the system needs to check that the dates for the flight and the hotel correlate. This rule can 
avert the following attack: Assume that the applicable rates are determined on the basis of the selected flight. 
Further, consider the case where the Web Service used to cancel already booked trips is inconsistently implemented 
such that the season and therefore the amount of the back payment is based on the chosen hotel. In such a situation 
and without the described examination of the method invocations, an attacker would be able to book a trip by 
selecting a flight in the post season and a hotel in the peak season. If s/he is canceling the tour afterwards and if the 
difference in prices is high enough, the attacker would make a profit, although cancellation fees may be charged. 
3. Only after the Payment Received service was executed successfully, the system may allow a call to Send Tickets. 
This prevents fraudulent use which is possible if the authorization check of the last Web Service is vulnerable. 
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Possible Implementation 
The attacks we are protecting against concern malicious invocations of Web Services. Given a call to a method an 
authorization engine has to decide, based on the history of the current instance of the business process and on the parameters 
of that call, whether it should be executed or not. In this section we give a brief overview of a possible implementation for the 
proposed solution. After describing the main components of the system we show how a modeling formalism such as 
BPEL4WS can help to realize it. 
System Components 
First of all, we must distinguish between design-time and run-time issues. The components of the system can be categorized 
into two classes as follows: 
1. Components concerning both design-time and run-time: 
a. Service (In, Out): 
Services are the objects to protect. Each service has got two parameters. The parameter “In” represents all 
the input data transmitted to the service when invoked. “Out” stands for the result data returned by the 
service after completion. A service potentially contains (implementation) flaws. 
b. Role: 
By “role” we mean a role in the sense of access control systems (Ferraiolo, Kuhn and Chandramouli, 2003). 
That is, only subjects belonging to a certain role are authorized to invoke a given service. We will not 
further consider the act of associating subjects with roles. Assertions concerning this association are 
received as SAML documents from the authentication process. The methods used for the authentication 
might be faulty, too.  
c. Business Process (Constraints): 
Hereby we mean a business process (BP) modeled from the application’s point of view, not from a 
technical one. The atomic tasks which make up a BP are the services. A BP determines the temporal and 
logical order as well as the combination in which the services have to be executed. Together with the BP, 
security constraints may be specified, which determine conditions for granting access rights to the services. 
The simplest (degenerate) BP would consist of a single service. A constraint could indicate the roles 
allowed to invoke this service. 
2. Components concerning run-time only: 
a. Business Process Instance: 
At runtime there may be one or more incarnations of a BP. One such incarnation is called a “business 
process instance” (BPI). Comparing this to an object oriented programming language, BPs would 
correspond to classes and BPIs to objects. 
b. Business Process Instance ID: 
Each BPI is uniquely identified by a so called “business process instance ID” (BPI-ID). Every time a caller 
invokes a service s/he uses such a BPI-ID to specify the BPI s/he is referring to. That is, services can only 
be executed within the context of a running BPI. 
c. Invocation (inVal, outVal, contextVal): 
When a service is invoked with the parameter value “inVal” and returns “outVal” as the result, we speak of 
an “invocation (inVal, outVal, contextVal)”, where “contextVal” sums up all relevant context information 
of the service call. contextVal consists of the calling time, the role of the caller, the BPI-ID of the business 
process instance the call belongs to, etc. 
d. History: 
The history is a repository for all the invocations executed so far along the belonging inVal, outVal and 
contextVal. 
e. Security Rules: 
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Security rules are (automatically) generated from the modeled BP and the corresponding constraints. They 
determine in which context a given invocation is admissible. 
f. Entities: 
Every variable (role, input and output parameters, BPI-ID, time, etc.) used to decide whether a call to a 
service should be executed or not is called an “entity”. Entities are the variables the security rules refer to.  
g. Evidence: 
At run-time the entities are assigned concrete values. The sum of this information we call “evidence”.  
h. Authorization Engine: 
The “authorization engine” decides whether a given call to a service is admissible or not. To do so, the 
currently available evidence (which comes from inVal, contextVal and the history) is assigned to the 
appropriate entities. Then the generated security rules are evaluated in order to make a decision. 
BPEL4WS 
BPEL4WS is a programming abstraction that allows developers to compose multiple synchronous and asynchronous Web 
Services into an end-to-end business flow. It provides for the modeling of business processes made up of service invocations. 
BPEL4WS is an extensible language permitting the introduction of new elements to satisfy special needs. We think that it can 
be used even without such an extension to help implement the above presented system. All the described components can be 
expressed using constructs contained in BPEL4WS. 
The history (i.e. the current state of the BPI) can be traced using „variables”. In BPEL4WS variables are state variables 
permitting the maintenance of the state of a business process. Variables associated with message types can be specified as 
input or output variables. This is how to store the InVal and OutVal parameter sets mentioned above. By assigning concrete 
values to the variables during execution (using BPEL4WS’ assign activity) evidence is gathered. More evidence lies 
implicitly in the path taken by the business process instance. Recall that a BP may contain different paths from which the BPI 
may choose one according to preset conditions at run-time. 
Correlations are suitable for implementing the concept of BPI-IDs. In BPEL4WS “(global) correlation sets” are used as 
aliases for the identities of business process instances. Using them the protocol can figure out which BPI a given message 
belongs to. The In and Out parameters can be represented by “message properties”. In WSDL each operation of a port type 
has got input and/or output messages. 
The constraints leading (together with the structure of the BP) to rules could be modeled through “join conditions”. In 
BPEL4WS each activity has a join condition. If this Boolean expression evaluates to true, the corresponding activity is 
executed else it is not. Due to the use of XPath 1.0 to specify join conditions in the current version of BPEL4WS the 
expressiveness of constraints would however be restricted, as, for example, it is only possible to do calculations with integers 
(i.e. divisions are not permitted) and strings can only be checked for equality but not arbitrarily manipulated. But in the 
future, richer languages like XQuery (Brundage, 2004) are expected to be used in conjunction with BPEL4WS enabling the 
formulation of more complex constraints. In practice, the modeling of a BP can be supported by appropriate tools, which 
could make suggestions about the constraints and group them hierarchically to facilitate their administration. 
It is important to note that using BPEL4WS is just one option. The components we defined abstractly in the last subsection 
could also be implemented using other languages. For example if a business process management engine is already in place 
its formalism should be used in order to avoid modeling the same workflows twice.  
CONCLUSION 
The standards surrounding Web Services still have to be seen a work in progress, and some aspects need further 
developments. Nevertheless, we clearly see advantages of using Web Services in the area of flexible integration and therefore 
the necessity of securing them. 
This paper presents an authorization engine that implicitly restricts potential attackers rather than explicitly forbidding them 
to execute certain operations. The proposed solution will not always thwart a misuse of the services. A denial of service 
attack for instance has to be prevented by other means. However, especially the danger of a “semantic” attack is reduced, 
which improves the overall security.  
The main drawback of our approach is the additional overhead it causes. The study we mentioned at the beginning (META 
Group, 2003) states that enterprises are concerned about the costs of securing Web Services. The costs introduced by our 
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approach are mainly due to the necessity of modeling the business processes. Each of their facets, such as the relationships 
between exchanged massages, has to be specified in detail. This disadvantage is however relativized by the fact that a neat 
modeling of the business processes is useful, independent of security considerations. It helps optimizing the processes and 
improving their quality.  
As with most research fields there are many areas for improvement and future study. So far we concentrated on securing a set 
of Web Services hosted by a single server on which the authorization engine runs. It would be interesting to examine how to 
extend this solution to the case of multiple Web Services providers. A future goal could also be the development of a tool 
which can be used as a plug-in in integrated development environments like Microsoft’s Visual Studio® (Microsoft, 2004) or 
the Eclipse project (Eclipse, 2004). Such a tool could support the modeling of business processes and the specification of 
security constraints and could use the results to automatically generate the rules applied by the authorization engine. 
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